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Is Life (or at least socio-economic aspects of it)
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Abstract The enterprise of trying to explain different social and economic phe-
nomena using concepts and ideas drawn from physics has a long history. Statistical
mechanics, in particular, has been often seen as most likely to provide the means
to achieve this, because it provides a lucid and concrete framework for describing
the collective behavior of systems comprising large numbers of interacting entities.
Several physicists have, in recent years, attempted to use such tools to throw light
on the mechanisms underlying a plethora of socio-economic phenomena. These en-
deavors have led them to develop a community identity - with their academic en-
terprise being dubbed as “econophysics” by some. However, the emergence of this
field has also exposed several academic fault-lines. Social scientists often regard
physics-inspired models, such as those involving spins coupled to each other, as
over-simplifications of empirical phenomena. At the same time, while models of
rational agents who strategically make choices based on complete information so
as to maximize their utility are commonly used in economics, many physicists con-
sider them to be caricatures of reality. We show here that while these contrasting
approaches may seem irreconcilable there are in fact many parallels and analogies
between them. In addition, we suggest that a new formulation of statistical mechan-
ics may be necessary to permit a complete mapping of the game-theoretic formalism
to a statistical physics framework. This may indeed turn out to be the most signifi-
cant contribution of econophysics.
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1 Introduction
The physicist Ernest Rutherford is believed to have once distinguished physics from
the other sciences, referring to the latter as merely “stamp collecting” [1]. While
Rutherford may have been exceptional in explicitly voicing the traditional arro-
gance of physicists to other branches of knowledge, it is true that the spectacular
success of physics in explaining the natural world has led many physicists to be-
lieve that progress has not happened in other sciences because those working in
these fields are not trained to examine observed phenomena from the perspective
of physics. Intriguingly, practitioners in several branches of knowledge have also
occasionally looked at physics as a model to aspire to, a phenomenon sometimes re-
ferred to as “Physics-envy”. For instance, the science of economics has undergone
such a phase, particularly in the late nineteenth century, and concepts from classical
physics, such as equilibria and their stability, were central to the development of
the field during this period [2]. However, this situation gradually changed starting at
the beginning of the twentieth century, curiously just around the time when physics
was about to be transformed by the “quantum revolution”, and economics took a
more formal, mathematical turn. The development of game theory starting from the
1920s and 1930s eventually provided a new de facto language for theorizing about
economic and social phenomena. However, despite this apparent “parting of ways”
between economics and physics, there have been several attempts, if somewhat iso-
lated, throughout the previous century to build bridges between these two fields. In
the 1990s, these efforts achieved sufficient traction and a sub-discipline sometimes
referred to as “econophysics” emerged with the stated aim of explaining economic
phenomena using tools from different branches of physics [3].
In earlier times, the branch of physics now known as dynamical systems theory
had been a rich source of ideas for economists developing their field. More recently,
however, it has been the field of statistical mechanics, which tries to explain the
emergence of systems-level properties at the macro-scale as a result of interactions
between its components at the micro-scale, that has become a key source of concepts
and techniques used to quantitatively model various social and economic phenom-
ena. The central idea underlying this enterprise of developing statistical mechanics-
inspired models is that, while the behavior of individuals may be essentially un-
predictable, the collective behavior of a large population comprising many such
individuals interacting with each other may exhibit characteristic patterns that are
amenable to quantitative analysis and explanation, and could possibly even be pre-
dicted. This may bring to one’s mind the fictional discipline of “psychohistory”, said
to have been devised by Hari Seldon of Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series fame [4],
that aimed to predict the large-scale features of future developments by discerning
statistical patterns inherent in large populations. Asimov, who was trained in chem-
istry (and was a Professor of Biochemistry at Boston University), in fact used the
analogy of a gas, where the trajectory of any individual molecule is almost impossi-
ble to predict, although the behavior of a macroscopic volume is strictly constrained
by well-understood laws.
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A large number of the statistical mechanics-inspired models for explaining eco-
nomic phenomena appear to use the framework of interacting spins. This is perhaps
not surprising given that spin models provide perhaps the simplest descriptions of
how order can emerge spontaneously out of disorder. An everyday instance of such
a self-organized order-disorder transition is exemplified by the so-called “effect of
a staring crowd” [5]. Consider a usual city street where pedestrians walking along
the sidewalk are each looking in different arbitrarily chosen directions. This corre-
sponds to a “disordered” situation, where each component is essentially acting inde-
pendently and no coordination is observed globally. If however a pedestrian at some
point persistently keeps looking at a particular object in her field of view (which
corresponds to a fluctuation event arising through chance), this action may induce
other pedestrians to also do likewise - even though there may actually be nothing
remarkable to look at. Eventually, it may be that the gaze of almost all pedestrians
will be aligned with each other and each of them will be staring into the same point
in space that is devoid of any intrinsic interest. This situation will correspond to the
spontaneous emergence of “order” through interactions between the components,
i.e., as a result of the pedestrians responding almost unconsciously to each other’s
actions. It is of course also possible to have everyone stare towards the same point
by having an out-of-the-ordinary event (a “stimulus”) happen there. In this case, it
will be the stimulus extrinsic to the pedestrians - rather than interactions between
the individuals - that causes the transition from the disordered to ordered state.
The simplest of the spin models, the Ising model, was originally proposed to
understand spontaneous magnetization in ferromagnetic materials below a critical
temperature. It assumed the existence of a large number of elementary spins, each
of which could orient in any one of two possible directions (“up” or “down”, say).
Each spin is coupled to neighboring spins through exchange interactions, which
makes it energetically favorable for neighboring spin pairs to be both oriented in
the same direction. However, when the system is immersed in a finite temperature
environment, thermal fluctuations can provide spins with sufficient energy to over-
ride the cost associated with neighboring spins being oppositely aligned. The spins
could also be subject to the influence of an external field that will break the symme-
try between the two orientations and will make one of the directions preferable to
the spins. By associating temperature to the degree of noise or uncertainty among
agents, field to any external influence on the agents and exchange coupling between
spins to interaction between individuals in their social milieu, it is easy to see that
the Ising model can be employed to quantitatively model a variety of social and eco-
nomic situations involving a large number of interacting individuals. Such modeling
is particularly relevant when the question of interest involves qualitative changes
that occur in the collective behavior as different system parameters are varied. The
nature of the transition may also be of much interest as external field-driven order-
ing typically manifests as a first-order or discontinuous transition, while transitions
orchestrated entirely through interactions between the components has the charac-
teristics of a second-order or continuous transition. As the latter is often associated
with so-called power laws, it is not unusual that these are often much sought after by
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physicists modeling social or economic phenomena (sometimes to the puzzlement
of economists).
The popularity of spin models in the econophysics community has however not
percolated to mainstream social scientists, who, probably justifiably, find such mod-
els to be overly simplified descriptions of reality. Many economic and social phe-
nomena are therefore quantitatively described in terms of game theoretic models,
where the strategic considerations of individuals, who rationally choose between al-
ternatives in order to maximize their utilities or payoffs, come to the fore. However,
such approaches have also been criticized as being based upon an idealized view of
the capabilities of individual agents and of the information that they have access to
for making decisions. A complete description of aspects of economic life is possibly
neither provided by spin models nor by game-theoretic ones - but being two very
different types of caricatures of reality, an attempt to integrate these two approaches
may provide us with a more nuanced understanding of the underlying phenomena.
With this aim in view, in the two following sections we describe in brief the essential
framework of these two approaches that are used to understand collective behavior
in a population of agents. We show that despite differences, there are in fact many
parallels and analogies between spin model-based and game theoretic approaches
to describing social phenomena. We conclude with the suggestion that the statistical
mechanics approach used at present may not be completely adequate for describing
strategic interactions between rational agents that is the domain of game theory. This
calls for the development of a new formalism that will allow seamless integration of
statistical mechanics with game theory - which will possibly be the most enduring
contribution of econophysics to the scientific enterprise.
2 Collective decision making by agents: Spins . . .
We can motivate a series of models of the dynamics of collective decision making
by agents that differ in terms of the level of details or information resolution that
one is willing to consider. We begin by considering a group of N agents, each of
whom are faced with the problem of having to choose between a finite number of
possible options at each time step t, where the temporal evolution of the system is
assumed to occur over discrete intervals. To simplify matters we consider the special
case of binary decisions in which the agents, for instance, simply choose between
“yes” or “no”. Thus, in the framework of statistical physics, the state of each agent
(representing the choice made by it) can be mapped to an Ising spin variable Si =
±1. Just as spin orientations are influenced by the exchange interaction coupling
with their neighbors in the Ising model, agents take decisions that can, in principle,
be based on the information regarding the choices made by other agents (with whom
they are directly connected over a social network) in the past - as well as the memory
of its own previous choices. If an agent needs to explicitly identify the specific
choice made by each neighbor in order to take a decision, then this constitutes the
most detailed input information scenario. Here, each agent i considers the choices
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made by its ki neighbors in the social network of which it is a part (if its own choices
also need to be taken into account we may assume that it includes itself in its set
of neighbors). Furthermore, each agent i has a memory of the choices made by its
neighbors in the preceding mi time steps. Thus, the agent, upon being presented
with a history represented as a mi×ki binary matrix, has to choose between −1 and
+1. As there are 2miki possible histories that the agent may need to confront, this
calls for formulating an input-output function fi for the agent that, given a string of
miki bits, can generate the probability that the agent will make a particular choice,
viz., Pr(Si =+1) = fi({±1,±1, . . .±1}miki) and with Pr(Si =−1)= 1−Pr(Si =+1).
In other words, the choice of each agent i will be determined by a function whose
domain is a miki-dimensional hypercube and range is the unit interval [0,1].
The above situation is simplified by assuming that agents do not know the exact
identity of the choices made by each of its neighbors but only have access to the
aggregate information as to how many chose a particular option, e.g., +1. A natural
extension of this is the scenario where, instead of an explicit network, agents are
considered to essentially interact with the entire group. Such an effectively “mean-
field” like situation (where pairwise interactions between spins are replaced by a
self-consistent field representing the averaged effect of interactions of a spin with
the collective) will arise when, in particular, an agent’s choice is made on the basis of
a global observable that is the record of the outcome of choices made by all agents.
For instance, one can model financial markets in this manner, with agents deciding
whether to trade or not in an asset based entirely on its price, a variable that is acces-
sible to all agents and which changes depending on the aggregate choice behavior
of agents - with price rising if there is a net demand (more agents choose to buy
than sell) and falling if the opposite is true (more agents choose to sell than to buy).
Thus, if N+ and N− are the number of agents choosing +1 and −1, respectively,
then agents base their decision on their knowledge of the net number of agents who
choose one option rather than the other, i.e., N+−N− = ∑i Si = NM, with M being
the magnetization or average value of spin state in the Ising model. In this setting,
the choice of the ith agent having memory (as stated above) is made using informa-
tion about the value of M in the preceding mi time steps. Therefore, the input-output
function specifying the choice behavior of the agents maps a string of m continu-
ous variables1 lying in the interval [−1,1] to a probability for choosing a particular
option, viz., Pr(Si = +1) = fi(M1,M2, . . . ,Mm) where M j is the value of magneti-
zation j time steps earlier. One can view several agent-based models that seek to
reproduce the stylized features of price movements in financial markets as special
cases of this framework, including the model proposed by Vikram et al [6] that ex-
hibits heavy-tailed distributions for price fluctuations and trading volume which are
quantitatively similar to that observed empirically, as well as volatility clustering
and multifractality.
A further simplification can be achieved upon constraining the function fi to out-
put binary values, so that Pr(Si =+1) can only be either 0 or 1. The set of functional
values realized for all possible values of the argument (i.e., all possible histories that
1 We however note that as there only N agents whose choices need to be summed, the relevant
information can be expressed in log2(N+1) bits.
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an agent can confront) which defines the strategy of the agent can, in this case, be
written as a binary string of length 2m log2(N+1) = (N+1)m. It is easy to see that the
total number of possible distinct strategies is 2(N+1)
m
. In reality, of course, many
of these possible strategies may not make much sense and one would be focusing
on the subset for which fi has some well-behaved properties such as monotonicity.
To simplify the situation even more, the granularity of the information on choices
made in the past can be reduced [7]. In the most extreme case, the information about
the aggregate or net choice of agents at a particular instant can be reduced to a sin-
gle bit, viz., sign(M j) instead of M j. This will be the case, for instance, when one
only knows whether a particular option was chosen by the majority or not, and not
how many opted for that choice. The number of possible different histories that an
agent may confront is only 2m in this situation and thus, the total number of possible
strategies is 22
m
. The well-known Minority Game [8] can be seen as a special case
of this simplified formalism. It is the very anti-thesis of a coordination game with
each agent trying to be contrary to the majority. In other words, each agent is aiming
to use those fi which would ensure Si× sign(M) =−1.
In the detailed input information scenario described above, a Minority Game
(MG) like setting will translate into an Ising model defined over a network, where
connected spin pairs have anti-ferromagnetic interactions with each other. Such a
situation will correspond to a highly frustrated system, where the large number of
energy minima would correspond to the various possible efficient solutions of the
game. However, if the system remains at any particular equilibrium for all time, this
will not be a fair solution as certain individuals will always form the minority and
thus get benefits at the expense of others. A possible resolution that may make it
both efficient and fair is to allow for fluctuations that will force the collective state
to move continuously from one minima to another, without settling down into any
single one for a very long time.
An important feature of the MG is the ability of agents to adapt their strategies,
i.e., by evaluating at each time step the performance or payoff obtained by using
each of the strategies, the agent can switch between strategies in order to maximize
payoff. One can ask how the introduction of “learning” into the detailed input in-
formation scenario will affect the collective dynamics of the system. In the classical
MG setting, each agent begins by randomly sampling a small number of f s (typ-
ically 2) from the set of all possible input-output functions and then scores each
of them based on their performance against the input at each time step, thereafter
choosing the one with the highest score for the next round. In the detailed infor-
mation setting, we need to take into account that an agent will need to consider the
interaction strength it has with each of its neighbors in the social network it is part
of. Thus, agents could adapt based on their performance not just by altering strat-
egy but also by varying the importance that they associate with information arriving
from their different neighbors (quantified in terms of weighted links). Hence, link
weight update dynamics could supplement (or even replace) the standard strategy
scoring mechanism used by agents to improve their payoffs in this case. For exam-
ple, an agent may strengthen links with those neighbors whose past choices have
been successful (i.e., they were part of the minority) while weakening links with
Is Life just Spin and Games ? 7
those who were unsuccessful. Alternatively, if agent i happened to choose Si cor-
rectly, i.e., so as to have a sign opposite to that of sign(M), while its neighbor agent
j chose wrongly, learning may lead to the link from j to i becoming positive (induc-
ing j to copy the choice made by i in the future) while the link from i to j becomes
negative (suggesting that i will choose the opposite of what j has chosen).
It may be worth noting in this context that the role of a link weight update rule
on collective dynamics has been investigated in the context of spin models earlier,
although in the different context of coordination where agents prefer to make similar
choices as their neighbors [9]. Using a learning rule that is motivated by the Hebbian
weight update dynamics that is often used to train artificial recurrent neural network
models, it has been seen that depending on the rate at which link weights adapt (rel-
ative to the spin state update timescale) and the degree of noise in the system, one
could have an extremely high diversity in the time required to converge to structural
balance (corresponding to spins spontaneously segregating into two clusters, such
that within each cluster all interactions are ferromagnetic and all interactions be-
tween spins belonging to different clusters are anti-ferromagnetic) from an initially
frustrated system. It is intriguing to speculate as to what will be observed if instead
the learning dynamics tries to make the spins mis-align with their neighbors, which
would be closer to the situation of MG.
3 Collective decision making by agents: . . . and Games
We now shift our focus from the relatively simpler spin-model inspired descriptions
of collective behavior of agents to those that explicitly incorporate strategic consid-
erations in the decision-making of agents. Not surprisingly, this often involves using
ideas from game theory. Developed by John von Neumann in the early part of the
20th century, the mathematical theory of games provides a rigorous framework to
describe decision-making by “rational” agents.
It appears intuitive that the states of binary Ising-like spins can be mapped to the
different choices of agents when they are only allowed to opt between two possi-
ble actions. We will call these two options available to each agent as action A and
action B, respectively (e.g., in the case of the game Prisoners’ Dilemma, these will
correspond to “cooperation” and “defection”, respectively). However, unlike in spin
models, in the case of games it is difficult to see in general that the choices of actions
by agents are somehow reducing an energy function describing the global state of
the system. This is because instead of trying to maximize the total payoff for the
entire population of agents, each agent (corresponding to a “spin”) is only trying to
maximize its own expected payoff - sometimes at the cost of others. Possibly the
only exception is the class of the Potential Games wherein one can, in principle,
express the desire of every agent to alter their action using a global function, viz.,
the “potential” function for the entire system.
Let us take a somewhat more detailed look into the analogy. For a spin-model,
one can write down the effective time-evolution behavior for each spin from the
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energy function as the laws of physics dictate that at each time step the spins will
try to adopt the orientation that will allow the system as a whole to travel “downhill”
along the landscape defined by the energy function
E =−∑
i j
Ji jSiS j+h∑
i
Si.
Here, Ji j refers to the strength of interaction between spins i and j, the summation
∑i j is performed over neighboring spin pairs and h refers to an external field. In the
absence of any thermal fluctuations (i.e., at zero temperature), it is easy to see that
the state of each spin will be updated according to
Si(t+1) = sign(∑
j
Ji jS j+h).
For the case of a symmetric 2-person game, the total utility resulting from the choice
of actions made by a group of agents whose collective behavior can be decomposed
into independent dyadic interactions, will be given by
U = R fAA+P fBB+(S+T ) fAB.
Here R and P refer to the payoffs obtained by two agents when both choose A or
both choose B, respectively, while if one chooses A and the other chooses B, the
former will receive S while the latter will receive T . The variables fAA, fBB and fAB
refer to the fraction of agent pairs who both choose A, or both choose B, or where
one chooses A while the other chooses B, respectively. On the other hand, for an
individual agent the payoff is expressed as
Ui =∑
j
pip jR+ pi(1− p j)S+(1− pi)p jT +(1− pi)(1− p j)P,
where pi, p j refer to the probabilities of agents i and j, respectively, to choose ac-
tion A. As an agent i can only alter its own strategy by varying pi, it will evaluate
∂Ui/∂ pi and increment or decrement pi so as to maximize Ui, eventually reaching
an equilibrium.
Different solution concepts will be manifested according to the different ways an
agent can model the possible strategy p j used by its opponent j (which of course
is unknown to the agent j). Thus, in order to solve the above equation the agent
i actually replaces the variable p j by its assumption pˆ j about that strategy. In the
conventional Nash solution framework, the agent is agnostic about its opponent’s
strategy so that even pˆ j is an unknown. To physicists, this approach may sound
similar to that of a maximum entropy formalism where the solution is obtained with
the least amount of prior knowledge about the situation at hand. However, advances
in cognitive science and attempts to develop artificial intelligence capable of semi-
human performance in various tasks have made us aware that human subjects rarely
approach a situation where they have to anticipate their opponent’s move with a
complete ‘blank slate’ (so to say). Even if the opponent is an individual who the
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Fig. 1 A schematic diagram illustrating the infinite regress of theories of mind (viz., ”she thinks
that I think that she thinks that I think that . . . ”) that two opponents use to guess the action that the
other will choose. Figure adapted from a drawing of the cover of the Division Bell music album of
Pink Floyd designed by Storm Thorgerson based on illustrations by Keith Breeden.
subject is encountering for the first time, she is likely to employ a theory of mind to
try to guess the strategy of the opponent. Thus, for example, a goalie facing a penalty
kick will make a decision as to whether to jump to the left or the right as soon as the
kick is taken (human response time is too slow for it to make sense for the goalie to
wait until she actually sees which direction the ball is kicked) by trying to simulate
within her mind the thought process of the player taking the kick. In turn, the player
taking the penalty kick is also attempting to guess whether the goalie is more likely
to jump towards the left or the right, and will, so to say, try to “get inside the mind”
of the goalie. Each player is, of course, aware that the other player is trying to figure
out what she is thinking and will take this into account in their theory of mind of the
opponent. A little reflection will make it apparent that this process will ultimately
lead to an infinite regress where each individual is modeling the thought process of
the opponent simulating her own thought process, to figure out what the opponent
might be thinking, and so on and so forth (Fig. 1).
The co-action solution framework [10, 11] solves the problem of how agents
decide their strategy while taking into account the strategic considerations of their
opponent by assuming that if both agents are rational, then regardless of what exact
steps are used by each to arrive at the solution, they will eventually converge to the
same strategy. Thus, in this framework, pˆ j = pi. This results in solutions that often
differ drastically from those obtained in the Nash framework. For example, let us
consider the case of the 2-person Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), a well-known instance
of a social dilemma. Here, the action chosen by each of the agents in order to max-
imize their individual payoffs paradoxically results in both of them ending up with
a much inferior outcome than that would have been obtained with an alternative set
of choices. In PD, each agent has the choice of either cooperation (C: action A) or
defection (D: action B) and the payoffs for each possible pair of actions chosen by
the two (viz., CC, DD, CD or DC) have the hierarchical relation T > R > P > S.
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The value of the payoff T is said to quantify the temptation of an agent for unilateral
defection, while R is the reward for mutual cooperation, P is the penalty paid when
both agents choose defection and S is the so-called “sucker’s payoff” obtained by
the agent whose decision to cooperate has been met with defection by its opponent.
Other symmetric 2-person games can be defined upon altering the hierarchy among
the values of the different payoffs. Thus, T > R > S > P characterizes a game re-
ferred to as Chicken (alternatively referred to as Hawk-Dove or Snowdrift) that has
been used extensively to model phenomena ranging from nuclear sabre-rattling be-
tween nations (with the prospect of mutually assured destruction) to evolutionary
biology. Another frequently studied game called Stag Hunt, which is used to analyze
social situations that require agents to coordinate their actions in order to achieve
maximum payoff, is obtained when R> T ≥ P> S.
In the Nash framework, the only solution to a one-shot PD (i.e., when the game
is played only once) is for both agents to choose defection. As is easily seen, they
therefore end up with P, whereas if they had both cooperated they would have re-
ceived R which is a higher payoff. This represents the dilemma illustrated by the
game, namely that choosing to act in a way which appears to be optimal for the
individual may actually yield a sub-optimal result for both players. Indeed, when
human subjects are asked to play this game with each other, they are often seen
to instinctively choose cooperation over defection. While this may be explained by
assuming irrationality on the part of the human players, it is worth noting that the
apparently naive behavior on the part of the players actually allows them to obtain
a higher payoff than they would have received had they been strictly “rational” in
the Nash sense. In fact, the rather myopic interpretation of rationality in the Nash
perspective may be indicative of more fundamental issues. As has been pointed out
in Ref. [10], there is a contradiction between the two assumptions underlying the
Nash solution, viz., (i) the players are aware that they are both equally rational and
(ii) that each agent is capable of unilateral deviation, i.e., to choose an action that
is independent of what its opponent does. The co-action framework resolves this by
noting that if a player knows that the other is just as rational as her, she will take this
into account and thus realize that both will eventually use the same strategy (if not
the same action, as in the case of a mixed strategy). Therefore, cooperation is much
more likely in the solution of PD in the co-action framework, which is in line with
empirical observations.
A much richer set of possibilities emerges when one allows the game to be played
repeatedly between the same set of agents. In this iterative version of PD (IPD), mu-
tual defection is no longer the only solution even in the Nash framework, because
agents need to now take into account the history of prior interactions with their
opponents. Thus, direct reciprocity between agents where, for example, an act of
cooperation by an agent in a particular round is matched by a reciprocating act of
cooperation by its opponent in the next round, can help in maintaining coopera-
tion in the face of the ever-present temptation towards unilateral defection. Indeed,
folk theorems indicate that mutual cooperation is a possible equilibrium solution of
the infinitely repeated IPD. Multiple reciprocal strategies, such as “tit-for-tat” and
“win-stay, lose-shift” have been devised and their performance tested in computer
Is Life just Spin and Games ? 11
tournaments for PD. Intriguingly, it has been shown that when repeated interactions
are allowed between rational agents, the co-action solution is for agents to adopt a
Pavlov strategy. In this, an agent sticks to its previous choice if it has been able to
achieve a sufficiently high payoff but alters the choice if it receives a low payoff,
which allows robust cooperation to emerge and maintain itself [11].
Moving beyond dyadic interactions to general N-person games, the analysis of
situations where an agent simultaneously interacts with multiple neighbors can be-
come a formidable task, especially with increasing number of agents. Thus, one
may need to simplify the problem considerably in order to investigate collective dy-
namics of a group of rational agents having strategic interactions with each other.
One possible approach - which deviates somewhat from the strictly rational nature
of the agents - invokes the concept of bounded rationality. Here, the ability of an
agent to find the optimal strategy that will maximize its payoff is constrained by its
cognitive capabilities and/or the nature of the information it has access to. A notable
example of such an approach is the model proposed by Martin Nowak and Robert
May [12], where a large number of agents, arranged on a lattice, simultaneously
engage in PD with all their neighbors in an iterative fashion. As in the conventional
2-player iterated PD, each agent may choose to either cooperate or defect at each
round, but with the difference that the agents nominate a single action that it uses in
its interactions with each of its neighbors. At the end of each round, agents accumu-
late the total payoff received from each interaction and compares it with those of its
neighbors. It then copies the action of the neighbor having the highest payoff to use
in the next round. Note that each agent only has access to information regarding the
decisions of agents in a local region, viz. its topological neighborhood, and hence
the nature of the collective dynamics is intrinsically dependent on the structure of
the underlying connection network. Nowak and May demonstrated that the model
can sustain a non-zero fraction of cooperating agents, even after a very large number
of rounds. In other words, limiting interactions to an agent’s network neighborhood
may allow cooperation to remain a viable outcome - a concept that has been referred
to as network reciprocity.
The model described above has been extremely influential, particularly in the
physics community, where it has motivated a large number of studies that have built
upon the basic framework provided by Nowak and May. Beyond the implications
for how cooperation can be sustained in a population of selfish individuals, these
studies have revealed tantalizing links between game theory and statistical physics.
For instance, by considering the distinct collective dynamical regimes as phases,
one may describe the switching between these regimes in terms of non-equilibrium
phase transitions. The non-equilibrium nature is manifest from the breakdown of de-
tailed balance (where the transition rate from one state to another is exactly matched
by that of the reverse process) because of the existence of absorbing states. These
states are defined by cessation of further evolution once they are reached by the
system and correspond to either all agents being cooperators or all being defectors.
The system cannot escape these states as agents can only copy actions that are still
extant in the population.
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While Nowak and May had considered a deterministic updating procedure (viz.,
the ‘imitate the best’ rule described above), there have been several variants that
have incorporated the effect of uncertainty in an agent’s decision-making process.
One of the most commonly used approaches is to allow each agent i to choose a
neighbor j at random and copy its action with a probability given by the Fermi
distribution function:
Πi→ j =
1
1+ exp(−(pi j−pii)/K) ,
where pii and pi j are, respectively, the total payoffs received by agents i and j in the
previous round, and K is the effective temperature or noise in the decision-making
process [13]. The utility of this function is that it allows one to smoothly interpolate
between a deterministic situation in the limit K→ 0 (viz., agent i will copy agent j
if pi j > pii) and a completely random situation in the limit K→ ∞ (viz., agent i will
effectively toss a coin to decide whether to copy agent j). Implementing this scheme
in a population of agents whose interactions are governed by different connection
topologies allows us to investigate the spectrum of collective dynamical states that
arise, and the transitions between them that take place upon varying system param-
eters [14].
Fig. 2 shows the different collective states of the system that occur at various
regions of the (K,T ) parameter space. It is tempting to compare this with the phase
diagrams obtained by varying the temperature and external field in spin systems.
First, the state of an agent, i.e., the action chosen by it at a particular time instant,
can be mapped to a spin orientation - e.g., if the ith agent chooses cooperation, then
the corresponding spin state can be designated Si = +1, whereas Si = −1 implies
that the agent has chosen defection. Typically, there is symmetry between the two
orientations {−1,+1} that a spin can adopt. However, in games such as PD one
of the actions may be preferable to another under all circumstances (e.g., uncondi-
tional defection or p= 0 is the dominant strategy in PD). This implies the existence
of an effective external field, whose magnitude is linearly related to the ratio of the
temptation for defection and reward for cooperation payoffs, viz., 1− (T/R), that
results in one of the action choices being more likely to be adopted by an agent
than another. We also have noise in the state update dynamics of the agents as, for
a finite value of K, an agent stochastically decides whether to adopt the action of a
randomly selected neighbor who has a higher total payoff than it. This is not unlike
the situation where spins can sometimes switch to energetically unfavorable orien-
tations because of thermal fluctuations, when the system is in a finite temperature
environment.
Analogous to ordered states in spin systems (corresponding to the spins being
aligned), we have the collective states all C (all agents choose to cooperate) or all
D (all agents have chosen defection), and similar to a disordered state we observe
that the collective dynamics of agents can converge to a fluctuating state F where
agents keep switching between cooperation and defection. Just as in spin systems,
the phases are distinguished by using an order parameter, namely, magnetization per
spin m=∑i Si/N ∈ [−1,1], we can define an analogous quantity 2 fC−1, which is a
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Fig. 2 Schematic parameter space diagrams illustrating the dependence on the contact network
structure of the collective dynamics of a system of agents that synchronously evolve their states
(representing actions) through strategic interactions with their neighbors. Each agent in the system
adopts one of two possible actions at each round, viz. cooperate or defect, and receives an accu-
mulated payoff based on each of their neighbors choice of action. The agents update their action
at every round by choosing a neighbor at random and copying their action with a probability that
is given by a Fermi function, where the level of temperature (noise) is controlled by the parame-
ter K. The broken horizontal line in both panels corresponds to the case where the temptation T
(payoff for choosing defection when other agent has chosen cooperation) is equal to the reward R
for mutual cooperation. Hence the region above the line corresponds to the case where agents play
the Prisoners Dilemma game, while that below corresponds to the case where they play the Stag
Hunt game. Note that the temptation T can be viewed as a field, in analogy to spin systems, as its
value biases an agent’s preference for which action to choose. The three regimes displayed in each
case correspond to situations where the system converges to a state where all the agents cooperate
(“all C”), all agents choose defection (“all D”) or the states of the agents fluctuate over time (“F”).
We note that the region corresponding to fluctuations appears to comprise two large segments con-
nected by a narrow strip. However, the nature of the collective behavior is qualitatively different
in the two segments, as the dynamics observed for large K can be understood as arising due to
extremely long transience as a result of noise. The left panel displays the regimes obtained when
agents are placed on a two-dimensional lattice, where each agent has 8 neighbors, while the right
panel displays the situation where agents are placed on a homogeneous random network where all
nodes have 8 neighbors. The difference in the collective dynamics between the two scenarios is
most noticeable at intermediate values of K, where the system can converge to an all C state even
in the Prisoners Dilemma regime.
function of the key observable for the system of agents, viz., the fraction of agents
who are cooperating at any given time fC. As for m, the value of this quantity is
bounded between −1 (all D) and +1 (all C), with the F state yielding values close
to 0 provided sufficient averaging is done over time.
Note that despite this analogy between the parameters (viz., temperature/noise
and field/payoff bias) governing the collective dynamics of spin systems and that of
a population of agents that exhibit strategic interactions with each other, there are in
fact significant differences between the two. As is manifest from Fig. 2, an increase
in the noise K does not quite have the same meaning as raising the temperature in
spin systems. Unlike the latter situation, agents do not flip from cooperation to de-
fection with equal probability as the temperature/noise increases. Instead, with equal
probability agents either adopt the action chosen by a randomly selected neighbor
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or stick to their current action state. Not surprisingly, this implies that all C and
all D states will be stable (for different values of the field T , the payoff value cor-
responding to temptation for unilateral defection, relative to the reward for mutual
cooperation) even when K diverges.
In addition, even in the absence of noise (i.e., at K = 0) we observe that agents
can keep switching between different actions. In other words, unlike the situation
in spin systems at zero temperature, the system will keep evolving dynamically.
When an agent determines that a randomly selected neighbor has higher total pay-
off than it, the agent will switch to the action chosen by its neighbor deterministi-
cally. Therefore, if there is a coexistence of cooperation and defection states there
will be switching between these two actions - thereby ensuring the existence of the
fluctuating state at K = 0.
Spin systems are also characterized by coarsening dynamics, wherein spins of
similar orientation coalesce over time to form domains. Existence of such domains
in a spin system, whereby spins of opposite orientations can coexist even in the
ordered phase, mean that even at low temperatures the global magnetization of a
sufficiently large systems can yield quite small values. This happens not because of
the absence of order, as is obvious, but because of coexistence of ordered regions
that happen to be oppositely aligned. At the boundary of two such domains, the
existence of spin pairs that are oppositely aligned means that there is a energy cost
which increases with the perimeter of the boundary. Thus, energy minimization will
result in the boundaries becoming smoother over time and the shape of the domains
eventually stabilize.
Agents on lattices or networks will also exhibit the spontaneous formation of
domains or clusters of interacting agents who have chosen the same action. Indeed,
in order to maintain cooperation in the system for any length of time (in the presence
of defectors), the cooperators will have to form clusters. Within these clusters agents
receive a sufficiently high payoff from cooperating neighbors to prevent them from
switching to defection, despite the potential for being exploited by any neighbor
that chooses to defect. However, the collective dynamics leads to a form of “anti-
coarsening”. This is because agents choosing defection would like to be surrounded
by as many cooperating agents as possible in order to maximize their payoff, so
that the boundary between groups of cooperators and defectors will tend to develop
kinks and corners over time, instead of becoming smoother as in the case of spins.
Furthermore, as the cooperators would tend to prefer as few defectors as possible at
neighboring positions, we would observe ceaseless flux in the shape of the domain
boundaries unless the system eventually converges to any one of the two absorbing
states, all C or all D.
As already mentioned earlier, the mechanism of agents copying the action of
neighbors who are more successful than them - although helping to simplify the
dynamics - is somewhat dis-satisfactory as the agents are now no longer strictly
rational. For instance, if the collective dynamics results in the system converging
to the all C absorbing state, all agents will always cooperate with each other from
that time onwards, as there is no agent left to copy the defection action from. Yet, in
a one-shot PD game, defection is always the dominant strategy as will be realized
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by any agent who is being “rational” and works out the implications of its action in
light of the payoff matrix (instead of blindly copying its neighbor). Of course, in the
iterated PD, it is no longer true that unconditional defection is the best strategy [15].
Nevertheless, an all C state is highly unstable as it provides a lucrative target for
agents who choose to defect, knowing that they will reap an extremely high payoff
at the expense of the cooperators. One possible way to prevent global cooperation
from being an absorbing state in the modeling framework described above is to
introduce a mutation probability. This will allow agents to spontaneously switch to
a particular action with a low probability, independent of whether any of their more
successful neighbors is using it or not. This will ensure that even if a population has
reached an all C state, it need not remain there always.
A more innovative approach that re-introduces the essential rationality of agents
in the context of studying the collective dynamics of a large number of agents in-
teracting over a social network has been introduced in Sharma et al [16]. Although
formulated in the specific context of agents making rational decisions as to whether
to get vaccinated (based on information about the incidence of a disease and knowl-
edge of how many neighbors have already gotten vaccinated), the framework can be
generally applied to understand many possible situations in which a large number
of agents make strategic decisions through interactions with other agents. In this ap-
proach, each agent plays a symmetric 2-person game with its “virtual self”, rather
than with any of its neighbors, in order to decide its action. The interaction with
neighbors is introduced by making specific entries in the payoff matrix that an agent
uses for its decision process into functions of the number of its neighbors who have
chosen a particular action. Thus, in the context of vaccination, if all its neighbors
have already chosen to vaccinate themselves, an agent is already protected from dis-
ease and is most likely to choose not to get vaccinated (thereby avoiding any real
or imagined cost associated with vaccination, e.g., perceived side-effects). As the
neighborhood of each agent is different (in general) when considering either a lat-
tice or a network, this means that each agent is playing a distinct game. Not only will
the games played by each other differ quantitatively (i.e., in terms of the payoffs of
the game) but also qualitatively. Thus, for instance, one agent may be playing what
is in effect PD while another may be playing Chicken. Initial explorations suggest
that such spatio-temporal variation of strategies may give rise to a rich variety of
collective dynamical phenomena, which have implications for problems as diverse
as designing voluntary vaccination programs so as to have maximum penetration in
a population and predicting voter turnout in elections.
4 In lieu of a Conclusion
The brief presentation in this chapter of several approaches towards understand-
ing the collective dynamics of a population of interacting agents, by using both
physics-inspired spin models and game theoretic models of rational individuals
making strategic decisions, has hopefully made it clear that there are clear parallels
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and analogies between the two frameworks. Although both are at best caricatures
of reality, albeit of different types, comparing and contrasting between the results
generated by both of these approaches should help us understand better how and
why large groups or crowds behave in certain ways. While physicists may harbor
the hope of revolutionizing the understanding of society through the use of simple
models of self-organizing phenomena, it may also be that the contribution may be
the other way around. In general, for a group of rational agents, unlike the case in
spin models, there appears to be no single global function (such as energy) whose
minimization leads to the collective states. Thus, it appears that the traditional tools
of statistical mechanics maybe inadequate for describing situations where the same
collective state may have different utilities for each agent. For instance, in PD, agent
1 choosing C while agent 2 choosing D, may be the best of all possible outcomes
for 2 - but it is the worst of all possible outcomes for agent 1. Therefore, while agent
2 may be desirous of nudging the system to such an outcome, agent 1 maybe as
vehemently trying to push the system away from such a state. How then would one
proceed to model the collective activity of such systems using the present tools of
statistical mechanics ? It does appear that we may need to have a new formulation of
statistical mechanics that applies to the situation outlined above. Thus, it may well
turn out that the lasting significance of econophysics will be in not what it does for
economics, but rather in the new, innovative types of physical theories, particularly
in statistical physics, that it may spawn.
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